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ABSTRACT
If a specified amount of government spending must be financed, how
should that finance be divided between taxes and government borrowing? In
the case of a temporary increase in government spending, it has been argued
that debt finance is optimal because the small increments in all future
tax rates to finance interest payments involves a smaller excess burden
than the single large tax rate increase that would be required to avoid an
initial increase in the national debt. This argument ignores the excess
burden of debt finance that results if the initial capital stock is smaller
than optimal (e.g., because of taxes or capital income).
The first section of the present paper shows how the debt—finance
advantage of a small increase in tax rates can be explicitly balanced against
the disadvantage of the excess burden that arises from additional debt. The
analysis shows that, with plausible parameter values, the excess burden of
debt finance is likely to outweigh the advantage of avoiding a large single
tax change and therefore that financing a temporary increase in government
spending by an immediate tax increase is likely to be preferable to debt
financing.
The second section examines the appropriate response to a permanent
increase in government spending and shows that such spending cannot be
financed by a permanent increase in government debt, Moreover, whenever the
golden rule level of capital intensity is an optimality condition independent
of the level of government spending, any increase in government spending
should be matched by an equal increase in tax revenue.
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Cambridge, MA 02138
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This paper investigates what is probably the most basic question in
public finance: If a specified amount of government spending must be
financed, how should that finance be divided between taxes and government
borrowing? Rather surprisingly, this question has been given relatively
little analytic attention.
The nineteenth century writers on fiscal theory advocated balanced
budgets but did so as a matter of virtue and prudence rather than as a result
of an analysis of economic efficiency.1 Balanced budgets were also preferred
as a matter of equity on the "benefit principle" of taxation as a way of
forcing the beneficiaries of government spending to payforthose outlays.2
It was also emphasized by Wicksell (1896) and others that the principle of
balanced budgets causes the political process to weight the costs and benefits
of government spending more carefully. I shall ignore these issues in the
current paper in order to focus directly on the relative economic efficiency
of taxation and debt finance.
*Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research. I am
grateful for discussions with J. Fleming, P. Krugman and L. Lindsey. This
research is part of the NBER project on The Government Budget and the Private
Economy.
1See, for example, Bastable (1903) and the discussion in Buchanan and
Wagner (1911, Chapter 2).
2See Musgrave (1959)fora discussion of this.—2—
There is, however, one common line of reasoning which suggests the
contrary conclusion that any temporary increase in government spending should
be financed by borrowing with only enough increase in taxes to finance the
interest on the increased public debt. This conclusion starts from the obser-
vation that the excess burden of taxation depends on the square of the tax
rate. It follows from this that it is better to have a large number of small
increments in the tax rate over time to finance interest payments than to have
a single large increase in the tax rate to finance the initial spending.3
This argument ignores the possibility that an increase in the public
debt involves an additional excess burden. If the initial capital stock is
smaller than optimal (e.g., because of taxes on capital income) and the
increase in government borrowing reduces the capital stock further,1 the debt
financing entails a separate excess burden that must be explicitly recognized
in the choice between debt and taxes.5 Equivalently, if the interest rate on
the public debt that the government uses to finance the increased spending (or
the marginal product of the capital displaced by public borrowing) exceeds the
discount rate that is appropriate for intertemporal welfare aggregation, the
3mis line of argument can be found in Barro (1979).
There is a large literature, including an important paper by
Modigliani (1961), that establishes that an increase in government debt redu—
ces the capital stock. Barro (l971) showed that under certain extreme con-
ditions the public borrowing would completely be offset by an induced equal
increase in private saving. I shall ignore this possibility in the current
paper unless I explicitly indicate otherwise.
5Note that the question of whether there is an excess burden of the
public debt is different from the traditional question of whether the debt
induces burden. Several authors, including Buchanan (1958), Diamond (1965),
Meade (1958) and Modigliani (1961) have shown that the debt conveys a burden on
future generations but did not discuss the implications of this for the choice
between debt finance and tax finance.—3—
debt finance involves a first—order excess burden.
The first section of the present paper shows how the debt—finance
advantage of a small increase in tax rates can be explicitly balanced against
the disadvantage of the excess burden that arises from additional debt. The
analysis shows that, with plausible parameter values, the excess burden of
debt finance is likely to outweigh the advantage of avoiding a large single
tax change and therefore that financing a temporary increase in government
spending by an immediate tax increase is likely to be preferable to debt
financing.
The second section examines the appropriate response to a permanent
increase in government spending and shows that such spending cannot be
financed by a permanent increase in government debt. There is a very brief
concluding section.
1. imaiF ncino morr SpendthgIncrease
Consider an econonr that is in full—employment growth equilibrium
with thepopulation and labor force growing at rate n.6 There are N people
in the labor force in year s and each individual supplies an amount of labor
2., making the total labor supply L =£N.The wage rate per unit of labor
rises because of technical progress at rate A, making w =
fort2. Taxes are levied at rate T on wage income, producing total revenue
6The assumption of full—employment explicitly rules out demand effects
of fiscal policy on the level of economic activity. The extent to which debt
finance may be preferred to tax finance in an econor with unemployed resources
depends on the interest sensitivity of money demand among other things.T =twL at time s. There are no taxes on capital income.7 SSs
The government initially has a spending plan that calls for outlays
of G in year s. In general, G need not equal T. The government then deci-
des to increase spending, in year 1 only, by an amount dG. Afteryear 1,
government spending (exclusive of interest payments on the national debt)
returns to its initial path. How should the increased spending be financed?
To answer the question, the total burden of financing dG dollars of
spending by taxes mist be compared with the total burden of financing dG
dollars of spending by borrowing at time 1 and subsequently paying interest on
the debt. If the burdens per dollar of tax revenue and per dollar of
borrowing remain constant for amounts up to dG dollars, the optimal financing
will be all taxes or all borrowing. If the burden per dollar varies with the
amount of taxation or borrowing, a mixed solution may be possible. I shall
assume that dG is small enough to imply constant per dollar burdens.
1.1 The Burden of Tax Finance
Financing the increased spending solely by additional taxation
(without any change in the government deficit or surplus) requires increasing
total tax revenue in year 1 by an amount equal to the increase in government
spending: dT1 =dG.Since T1 iw1L1, this implies
(1) dGw1L1dr +Tw1
TAtax on capital income would complicate the analysis substantially
without altering the basic structure of the argument as long as debt finance
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Equation 3 defines the increase in the tax rate required to finance
the additional spending. This higher tax rate imposes a burden on the popula-
tion that exceeds the amount of the revenue raised by the difference between
the value of the increase leisure that results from the distortionary taxation
and the pretax wages that might have been earned on that decrement of labor
supply.8 Because of the preexisting tax at rate T,thefirst unit of
increased leisure involves an excess burden of iw. Since the excess burden on
the final unit of increased leisure is therefore (r+dT)w1, the excess burden
is (t+O.5d1)w1dL1, where is the induced change in the labor supply implied
by the compensated supply function. Thus dL1 =[cL1f(1—t)]dt
where Cisthe
compensated labor supply elasticity. The excess burden of increasing the tax
8The change in leisure (and labor supply) is, of course, to be eva-
luated by the compensated labor supply functions.—6—
rate by di is therefore Ecw1L1(T+O.5dT)f(1—T)ldt. Note thatinthe absence of
a preexisting tax (i0) this reduces to the familiar excess burden "triangle"
formula, 0.5Cw1L1(dt)2.
The total burden of financing the increased government spending by
taxation is the sum of dG and this excess burden:
(14) BT =dG+[cwL(i+O.5d'r)/(l—T)ldr
where BT is the burden of finance by taxation and di satisfies the financing
requirement expressed by equation 3. Thus
— CT 1 dG (l—T) 5j B.,—dGL1+1 + C
—
I •W'ij / 11 1—i—in
The first term in the bracket represents the resources that are transferred to
finance the increased government spending. The second term is the first order
welfare loss that occurs because of the preexisting tax. The TT1 in the deno-
minator of that term increases this welfare loss, reflecting the fact that the
tax increase (di) causes a decline in labor supply (if n >0)and therefore in
the revenue collected at the preexisting tax rate. The final term is the
welfare loss caused by the increased tax rate and, unlike the second term,
remuins even if there is no preexisting tax. Note that this is a second order
term in that it is proportional to (dG)2/wL, the square of the increased
government spending as a proportion of the total tax base.
1.2 The Burden of Debt Finance
Financing the increased spending without a concurrent tax increase—7—
requires increasing the government debt in year 1 by an amount equal to the
increased spending, dG. The interest to be paid on that debt is then r•dG in
year 2 and all subsequent years.9 To finance this interest, the government
must raise the tax rate by an amount dT5 in each future year beginning with
year s =2.This increased tax rate will in general not be constant if the
tax base (wL) grows in future years. If the preexisting tax rate remains
constant at T and the labor supply elasticities also remain constant atand
ii, the burden of raising revenue rdG in year s2 is, by analogy with
equation 5,
______1 dG (i.-t)
(6) B,-. =r•dGIl+ + -
i_Is i—T--Tfl s—i s—i
w1L1(l+n) (i+A) (1—'r—tri)
where the extra term (i+n) reflects the growth of the population from s =1
and the term (i+x)1 reflects the growth of the wage rate.1-0
A further word about the annual interest cost is appropriate. In
thesimple model of the economy developed here, it is appropriate to assume
90nthe simplifying assumption that the interest rate remains
constant at r.
1-0Thisassumes that labor supply decisions are made myopically as a
function of the current net wage. If this is not true, the C and r of
equation 6 would be smaller than the corresponding values of equation 5.
Dropping the assumption of myopic labor supply and explicitly recognizing
interternporal labor substitution raises the excess burden of' tax finance but
does not alter the conclusion (derived below) that the basic excess burden of
debt finance is a first order magnitude while the basic excess burden of tax
finance is a second order magnitude.—8-.
that the interest rate is equal to the marginal product of capital. In a more
complete analysis, it would be necessary to recognize that the interest rate
on government debt may be less than the marginal product of capital and that
the government further reduces the net interest cost by taxing these interest
payments. Nevertheless, the government borrowing displaces private capital on
the earnings of which a tax would have been collected. On balance, the most
appropriate assumption is therefore that the interest rate in equation 6 is
equal to the marginal product of capital.
To compare the burden of tax finance and debt finance, the annual
debt finance burdens (BD) must be discounted back to year s =1.Since the
annual debt finance burdens are valued as the required compensating variations
in consumer income, the appropriate discount rate reflects the marginal rate
of substitution between consumers' income in adjacent years. Under certain
restrictive assumptions this implies that the appropriate discount rate would
be the same as the market interest rate, r. More generally, however, the two
will not be equal and the appropriate time preference discount rate (6) will
be less than the market interest rate.
An important practical reason for a lower discount rate would be the
presence of an individual income tax on interest income. Although I have
ignored the existence of such a tax in the derivation of equations 5 and 6 in
order to simplify the calculation of the annual excess burden of taxation, the
taxation of interest income could hardly be ignored in a more general analysis
of the appropriate discount rate.
But even in the absence of a tax on interest income, the appropriate
intertemporal discount rate may well be less than the marginal product of—9—
capital. &lthough the market interest rate might be regarded as an appropriate
rate for intrageneration aggregations of income, it need not be as an
appropriate basis for intergeneration comparisons of income. More specifi-
cally, if successive generations are not linked by bequests, there is no
rationale for aggregating income by the market interest rate. Even if the
generations are linked by bequests, there is no compelling reason to regard
the preferences of the bequethers as the normatively appropriate basis for
intertemporal comparisons.
An explicit utilitarian analysis would instead base the discount
rate on the rate of growth of per capita consumption and the elasticity of the
marginal utility function. If consumption grows at the same rate as wages Cx)
and the elasticity of the marginal utility function is denoted ii., the marginal
rate of substitution between income in adjacent years is
(i) =(i+X)11
andis the appropriate discount rate. The long—run growth of real per
capita consumption has been less than 2 percent.11 Although i is not obser-
vable, a value of p2 would be regarded as high since it would imply that
the marginal utility of consumption would be reduced to one—half of its pre—
vious value by a 41 percent increase in per capita consumption ——theincrease
that occurred between 1966 and 1982. A value of p =2and X =.02implies S =
11-From1929 through 1982, real per capita consumption in the United
States rose an an annual rate of 1.614 percent.—10—
.0i.A lower value of iorX would imply a lower value of 5. By comparison,
thepretax real rate of return on capital has averaged about 12 percent for
the postwarperiod (Feldstein, Poterba and Dicks—Mireaux). An explicit utili—
tarian calculation thus implies 5 <r.
Discounting the annual debt burdens given by equation 6 to time s
1 by the discount rate 5 implies
(8) BD =s2BD(l_)
rdG1 CT
11 c(i—T) r2(dG)2 —UL1+1—T--Trl + 2 2 w L (5-i-v+7
(l—T—Tn)ii
whereVn+A+nA is the growthrate oftotal wages.
1.3Comparing Tax and Debt Finance
Wecan now compare the burden of tax finance (BT of equation 5) with
the burden of debt finance of equation 8). The analysis is clearest if we
begin br examining the special case in which there is no preexisting tax (T0)
and in which the tax base remains constant (v0). In this special case, ED >





Severalconclusions (for this special case) are immediately
apparent. First, tax finance is preferable only if r >'5.It is the excess—11—
of r over 45 that implies an excess burden of debt finance that is separate
from the excess burden of tax finance. Second, the left hand side
(representing the excess burden that is particular to debt finance) is inde—
pendent of the relative size of the additional government spending while the
right hand side (representing the excess burden that is particular to tax
finance) varies in proportion to the ratio of the government spending increase
to the total tax base. The excess burden of the debt finance is a first order
magnitude while the excess burden of tax finance is a second order magnitude.
Thus, as dG/wL tends to zero, tax finance tends to be unequivocally better.
Third, the excess burden that is particular to debt finance does not depend on
the elasticity of labor supply while the excess burden that is particular to
tax finance does. Thus, as the compensated elasticity of labor supply tends
to zero, tax finance tends to be unequivocally better
A numerical example will illustrate the likely superiority of tax
finance. To make this point, I will overstate the values of those parameters
that favor debt finance (e, dG/wL and 15) and understate the parameter that
favors tax finances (r). Let c =1,dG/wL 0.1, 15 =0.05and r =0.10.Then
the inequality of (10) is satisfied since 1 > .04. Indeed, even with c =1,
dG/wL =0.1and r =0.10,the inequality is satisfied for any 15 less than
0.096. It takes a very small discrepancy between r and 15 to dictate tax
finance for even a relatively large increase in spending.
Examination of equations 5 and 8 shows that the pre—existence of an
initial tax at rate t has two effects. First, the preexisting tax implies an
extra first—order excess burden which is equal to (dG)t/(l—t—rn) for tax—12—
finance and to r(dG)cT/(l—r--Tfl) for debt finance. With r > ,theincreased
burden is greater for the debt finance. Second, the preexisting tax implies
that the second—order excess burden terms of both and BD are nultiplied by
l—T 1—T—Tfl; if n>1, this term is greater than one and the second order
excess burden terms areboth increased proportionately. Since the second—
order excess burden term is larger in the tax burden than in the debt burden,12
this increases the tax burden by more than it increases the debt burden.
Although these effects point in opposite directions, the net effect is unam-
biguously to increase the attractiveness of debt finance relative to tax
finance. To see this, note that combining equations 5and8andsimplifying
shows that BD > BT if and only if:
(ii) -1> E -
-T-Tfl)(l-T+T(C-flTh
Since c —n canbe expressed as the narginal propensity to consume leisure out
of exogenous income'3 and therefore C —n <1, the final term in square
brackets is unambiguously greater than one. The other terms are the same as
in inequality 10 (except for the terms involving V which were previously taken
to be zero) so that preexisting tax means that r/c5 must be greater than BD > BT.
Despite the additional terms, it remains true that for plausible
12The second—order term of the2debt burden equals the second—order
term of the tax burden multiplied by r /(+v-i-äv) < 1.
'3This follows directly from Slutsky decomposition of the uncompen—
sated elasticity: n =c—awL/aywhere y is exogenous income.—13—
parameter values > BT and tax finance if preferable. Since high values of
ri and V favor debt finance, I will select T =0.5,n= 0.5,and V =0.05.
With=1,r =0.1and dG/wL =0.1,inequality 11 is satisfied for any CS <
.089. With more realistic parameter values, the inequality implies that tax
finance is even more preferable to debt finance.
One further issue deserves comment. In assessing the cost of debt
finance I have assumed that individuals do not adjust their private saving to
offset the effect of government borrowing on the nation's capital stock. It
might instead be assumed, following Barro (19T'), that individuals would not
reduce their consumption in response to a temporary tax increase but would
instead reduce their previously accumulated assets (or borrow) in order to
spread the burden over the future in the same way that the government could by
borrowing, including a reduction in bequests to force future generations to
share in the financing of the incremental expenditure dG. This would increase
the burden of tax finance and could in principle reverse the preference bet-
ween debt and tax finance. Although some individuals may of course behave in
approximately this way, I believe (and have argued elsewhere at length, e.g.,
Feldstein 1982) that such a theory of behavior is of very limited overall
empirical relevance. A government that uses personal taxation to finance a
war or a temporary bulge in domestic spending is likely to find that such
taxation reduces consumption by substantially more than if the same spending
is instead financed by government borrowing.
2. Optimal Financing of a Permanent Spending Increase
The previous section focused on the optimal choice between debt and—3)4—
taxes to finance a temporary increase in government spending. The analysis
was an example of second—best policy for an economy in which some constraint
on government behavior prevented eliminating the difference between the margi-
nal product of capital and the rate of time discount. If that difference
could be eliminated, an increase in debt would be the preferred way to finance
a temporary increase in spending. But in the second—best situation of an ina-
dequate capital stock, an increase in taxation will, for plausible parameter
values, be preferable.
The present section examines a very different problem: the optimal
financing of a permanent increase in the per capital level of government
spending in an economy in steady state growth, with optimality defined as
maximizing the steady state utility level of a representative individual. No
constraint on tax policies is assumed although it is recognized that the
government does not have direct control over the economy's resources.
By analogy with the question posed in section 1, it is now natural
to ask under what conditions a permanent increase in government spending
should be financed by an equal increase in taxes and under what conditions it
should be financed by an increase in government debt. Such a question may
seem natural, but it fundamentally misconceives the nature of the long—run
financing problem.
The nature of the government's equilibrium budget constraint implies
that the correct question is: under what conditions should a permanent
increase in government spending be financed by an increase in taxes and under
what conditions should it be financed by a decrease in government debt. To
see this, consider an economy in steady state growth at rate n with current—15—
labor force N. The government has debt B on which it pays interest at rate r
which is equal to the nRrginal product of capital. It levies a tax T and has
initial government spending G. The government's total outlays are therefore G
+rB.It must finance this by a combination of tax revenue and the increase
in outstanding debt, B. On a steady state growth path, the debt must grow at
the same rate as population: B/B =nor B =nB.Thus the government's budget
constraint in equilibrium is
(12) G+rB=T+nB.
Dividing each term by the labor force and using lower case letters for the
resulting values (thus g =G/N)gives
(13) g =t—(r—n)b.
If the econoxmj's equilibrium corresponds to the golden rule level of
capital intensity, r =nand the taxes are necessarily equal to government
spending. More generally, if the capital intensity is less than the golden
rule level, r >nand equation 13 implies that g <t.Equation 13 also shows
that an increase in government spending must be financed either by an increase
in taxes with per capita debt unchanged (dg =dt)or, if taxes are unchanged, by
a decrease in per capita debt (dg =—(r—n)db).Of course, decreasing the
steady state level of per capital debt requires a period of increased tax
revenue. Thus, the real choice open to a government that increases per—
manently the level of spending is either to increase the level of taxation
permanently by an equal amount or to increase the level of taxation tern——16—
porarily by a greater than equal amount in order to reduce the existing
government debt. In either case, an increase in government spending requires
an increase in tax revenue.
When is it optimal for the government to respond to an increase in
steady—statespendingby an equal increase in the steady—state level of taxa-
tion, leaving the per capita level of government debt unchanged? Although an
interesting general characterization of necessary conditions does not seem
possible, it is clear from equation 13 that is optimal to offset any increase
in g by an equal increase in t whenever the golden rule level of capital
intensity is an optimality requirement that is independent of the level of g.
An important special case will illustrate the existence of such a
condition. Assume that each individual lives two periods, works an amount (9.)
during the first period and is fully retired during the second period. The
individual receives a wage rate w per unit of labor, pays a proportional tax
on his income at rate1—0,and therefore earns net labor income of 0w2. The
individual's decision about how must to work and to save is made by maximizing
a log—linear utility function1
(lb) u =ln c1 +(l—)in c2 +in (1—L)
subject to the budget constraint
(15) c2 =(0w9,—
c1)(1+r)
The first order conditions imply that the optimal labor supply is
£ =i/(i÷)and that c1 =aQwZ.The individual's utility can therefore be
i14The analysis would not be changed if a function ofg was added to
the termsinequation lii.—17—
written
(16) u =4) + inO +(i—a)in (1+r)
where 4)isa constant. The government's problem is to choose 6 to maximize u
of equation 16, subject of course to the constraints implied by the govern-
ment's budget, by the capital accumulation process, and by the links between
capital intensity and the values of w and r.
If k is the capital stock per unit of labor and f(k) is the output
per unit of labor, the marginal productivity conditions imply r =f'and
w =f—kf'.Instead of specifying a level of government debt, I will write
kg forthe amount of government capital. The government's budget constraint is,
by ana1or with equation 13,
(17) g =(l—O)w&+(f'—n)k
g
The stock of private capital (K) at any time is equal to the
previous savings of the current generation of retirees:
(18) K =(OwR.—c)N (l+n). p 1
In steady state equilibrium, the rate of growth of the private capital stock
mustequalthe rate of growth of the population: K/K =n.Equation 18
therefore implies that in steady state equilibrium
(19) £k =(O&—c)(l+nY1,
p 1
or, using the fact that c1 =ct6wZ,
(20) k =(i—a)(i+n1Ow.
p—18—
In equilibrium, the ratios of k and k to the total capital stock
per unit of labor must remain constant: let kg =ykand k =(L-y)k.Using
this constancy, equations 17 and 20 can be combined to solve for the capital
accumulation constraint:
(21) g —(l—O)wR.=(f'—n)I9,k—(l—cL)(l+n)Ow&].
The right hand side term in square brackets is the government capital stock
per worker, i.e., the excess of total capital per worker over the privately
provided savings of the current retirees. The entire right hand side is thus
equal to the earnings of the government's capital in excess of the amount
required to maintain that equilibrium level of government capital per capita.
The government's excess capital income can finance the difference between
government spending and tax revenue shown on the left hand side of the
equation.
Equation 21 can be solved for Ow as a function of k and this can be
substituted into equation 16 (using £ =l/(l+))to yield:









This is clearly satisfied by f' =n,thus establishing the optimality of the
golden rule level of capital intensity. It follows immediately from equation
1SAlthough the government does not control k directly, it can achieve
the desired level of k by its tax policy.—19—
21that in this caseany increasein g must therefore be financed by an equal
increase in tax revenue, (i—O)w.
Under nre general conditions on the nature of the individual's uti-
lityfunction or the structure ofthe tax system, it may not be optimal for
the government to achieve the golden rule level of capital intensity. If, at
the initial level of government spendingkg >0and f' >nthe earnings of
the government's capital stock help to finance the government spending. An
increase in g can then be financed either by an equal increase in taxes
(dt =dg)or by using a temporary period of even higher taxes to increase
k [(r—n)dk =d1.Ineither case, the result is an immediate increase in
g g g
taxes that is at least equal to the percent rise in g. It is only if the
optimal response to a rise in g is an even greater rise in the permanent level
of taxes that the immediate response would be a temporary tax decline.
3. Conclusion
An increase in government spending must be financed by an increase
in taxes.The optimal choice between tax finance and debt finance is really
a choice about the timing of those taxes. A permanent increase in government
spending must be matched by at leastan equally large permanent increase in
taxesunless taxes are increased by even more in the short run. As section 2
showed, there is no way to choose between a permanently higher level of taxes
anda permanently higher level of debt.
Inthemore realistic case in which the government must decide how
tofinance a temporary rise in spending, the choice is really an empirical—20--
question. If the capital stock is initially at an optimal level, it is in
general better to financea temporary risein spending by an increase in
government debt. But when the capital stock is initially belowtheoptimal
level, it is likely to be better to finance the spending increase by a con-
current increase in taxes. The analysis of section 1 showed that plausible
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